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Gauging Fiscal Policy: II 
In the last Weekly Letter, we showed that with 
a more realistic "natural" rate of unemploy-
ment than the one actually used, the Federal 
budget would "crowd out" substantially 
more private investment than normally ex-
pected. With a 6.S-percent unemployment 
rate, the high-employment budget indicates 
$29.5 billion of crowding out in 1980, ac-
cording to the national-income accounts 
(NIA) concept. Judging by this measure, the 
new Administration would have to take 
strong steps to reduce expenditures and in-
crease tax receipts if it wishes to eliminate 
crowding out and thus spur economic 
growth. But measurement of  the natural rate 
of unemployment is not the only problem 
involved. In addition, we must consider con-
ceptual problems which involve the choice 
of  the items to include on both the expendi-
tures and receipts sides of  the budget. 
Off-budget borrowing 
The NIA budget includes only the goods-
and-services expenditures and tax receipts 
that enter directly into the national-income 
accounts, and thus it excludes various Fed-
eral and federally assisted loans. This ap-
proach is legitimate for the purposes of 
national-income accounting, but it can be 
misleading if one is interested in the budget's 
impact on capital markets and aggregate 
spending. Thus, we should considerfour gen-
eral types of loans that are omitted from the 
high-employment budget. 
First, there are the Federal government's 
loans to the private sector which are included 
in the government's unified (operating) bud-
get but excluded from the NIA budget. These 
loans, amounting to $3.7 billion in 1980, 
include creditextensions by such agencies as 
the Export-Import Bank and the Small Busi-
ness Administration. Such loans must be fi-
nanced by borrowing from the public if tax 
receipts are not sufficient to cover them. 
The second major type of Federal loan ac-
tivity consists of  cred it  extEnded by Federal Iv-
owned but off-budget agencies. U nti I a few 
years ago, the unified-budget deficitcom-
prised practicaliy ali Federal government 
borrowing, but in recent years, off-budget 
Federal borrowing has become very signifi-
cant. Examples include the Federal Financing 
Bank and the Postal Service, which by law 
have been excluded from the unified budget 
even though they are parts of  the Federal 
Government. Off-budget borrowing sup-
ports a wide range of programs through the 
Federal Financing Bank and other entities-
including rural housing and electrification. 
programs, student loans, and foreign mili-
tary-sales credits. The total of  such borrowing 
amounted to $16.6 billion in 1980. 
Third is loan activity generated by privately 
owned but government sponsored agencies, 
includingthe Farm CreditAdministration, the 
Federal Home Loan Bank System, the Federal 
National Mortgage Association, and the Fed-
eral Home Mortgage Corporation. Like Fed-
erally owned agencies, these sponsored 
agencies channel credit to specialized sec-
tors of  the economy, either through direct 
loans to individual borrowers or through 
purchases of loans initiated in the private 
sector. In 1980, borrowing by Federally 
sponsored agencies added up to $22.7 bil-
lion. Despite the absence of Federal guar-
antees, the obligations of  these agencies sell 
at interest rates only moderately above the 
rates on comparable Treasury issues. 
The final category consists of loans for which 
the Federal Government (wholly or partly) 
guarantees or insures the payment of loan 
principal and/or interest. The best-known ex-
amples are FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed 
mortgages-although such guarantees have 
been increasingly used outside the housing 
field in recent years. In 1980, these agen-
cies extended $25.5 billion of  federally-
guaranteed loans. 
The net stimu Ius to private borrowing from 
these activites is notequal dollar-for-dollarto the amount of loan activity observed. Never-
theless, the average subsidy element over all 
programs is substantial. According to esti-
mates prepared by the Office of  Management 
and Budget, federally-subsidized borrowers 
will pay an 8.7-percent average interest rate 
in fiscal 1981, but would have had to pay a 
13-percent average rate without such subsi-
dies. Federal and federally-assisted credit 
activities have thus reduced interest costs by 
one-third from what  the private marketwould 
otherwise require. The net stimulus to private 
borrowing and aggregate demand depends 
upon the public's response to this amount of 
interest subsidy. We may assume that the 
percentage increase in loan demand equals 
the percentage reduction in the interest rate 
due to the subsidy. Consequently,' the net 
stimulus to private loan demand and spend-
ing equals one-third of  the observed Federal 
and federally assisted loans omitted from the 
high-employment budget. Thus, we should 
add this stimulus to loan demand into the 
expenditures side of  the budget to obtain a 
better measure of  the Federal government's 
net impact on capital markets and aggregate 
spending. 
~if1lHa~301l1l premiums 
The NIA high-employment budget not only 
omits a certain portion offederally-generated 
expenditures, but also includes other expen-
ditures which should have no impact on ei-
ther aggregate demand or the demand for 
credit. These payments consistofthe inflation 
premiums in the interest on Federal debt. Like 
other interest rates, nominal returns on 
government securities reflect 1) a real com-
ponent not directly affected by the rate of 
inflation, and 2) an inflation component that 
incorporates both borrowers' and lenders' 
expectations of inflation. The higher the ex-
pected rate of inflation, the higher the rate of 
interest that borrowers are willing to pay and 
that lenders require to protect the purchasing 
power of  their sacrifice in current consump-
tion. In recent years, interest rates have risen 
with inflation, and higher interest costs thus 
have swollen the NIA high employment bud-
get deficit. 
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But inflation premiums in the interest on Fed-
eral debt should neither stimulate aggregate 
demand nor increase the demand for credit 
because they are simply compensation for a 
hidden tax-in the form of an expected re-
duction in the real value of Federal debt due 
to inflation. Although inflation premiums in 
interest on the Federal debt enter into the 
measured income of savers, they do not con-
stitute an increase in permanent income that 
would boost consumption. All of  the inflation 
premiums must be saved if  the real value of 
Federal debt in private hands is not  to decl i  ne 
because of inflation. Only if  the real value of 
this wealth is kept intact can income and 
consumption be maintained in real terms. In 
theory then, inflation premiums should be 
saved and would not stimulate consumer 
spending in the \Nay that other federal pay-
ments to the public do. Unfortunately, whe-
therthis is true in fact is an empirical question 
on which we currently have little information. 
Similarly, in theory, any Government borrow-
ing for the payment of inflation premiums is 
self-financing. If  the Government must bor-
row to pay inflation premiums in the interest 
on its debt, holders of  debt should save this 
income in order to maintain the real value of 
their wealth. Since this added saving is re-
tu rned to the capital markets, Government 
borrowing to pay for inflation premiums is 
self-financing and therefore would not bid 
away loanable funds from private borrowers'~~ 
Consequently, to the extent that deficits are 
generated by borrowing to pay inflation pre-
miums to holders of  Government debt, there 
should be no crowding out. 
Thus, the impact of Federal budget expendi-
tures on aggregate demand and credit de-
mands is overstated by the amount of  the 
inflation premiums in interest payments. The 
solution is either 'to subtract these inflation 
premiums from expenditures or add them to 
receipts. The former procedure would in-
clude in expenditures on/ythose items which 
truly add to the public's income as well as to 
demand in the credit market. The latter ap-
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ed, or the hidden tax of the reduction in the 
real value of Federal debt due to inflation. 
In recent years inflationary expectations have 
adjusted relatively rapidly to inflation actual-
ly experienced. It has been estimated that the 
inflation anticipated by borrowers and lend-
ers in this country roughly equals the average 
actual inflation experienced over the previ-
ous two years. With an average maturity of 
Federal debt of about three years, higher in-
flation premiums are fairly quickly reflected 
in actual interest payments. We can calculate 
inflation premiums on newly issued debt by 
multiplying the average inflation rate (mea-
sured by the personal-consumption expendi-
tures deflator) over previous two years by the 
portion of the outstanding Federal debt being 
rolled over-assumed to be one-third. Total 
inflation premiums are then obtained by sum-
ming this series over the last three years. 
Inflation premiums in interest on the Federal 
debt have been larger than the estimated im-
pact of  the off-budget Federal and federally 
assisted borrowing in every year since 1973 
(see chart). Therefore, the official (NIA) high 
employment deficit is too high because the 
impact of omitted (or hidden) taxes is greater 
than that of omitted expenditures. But this 
bias is currently more than offset by an op-
posite bias resulting from the unrealistically 
low assumption about the size of the natural 
rate of unemployment. Thus the official 
high-employment budget, which assumes a 
S.1-percent unemployment rate, indicates a 
surplus of $7.2 billion for 1980. At the more 
realistic 6.5-percent rate of unemployment, 
this high-employment budget shifts to a def-
icit of $29.5 billion. And with the other ad-
justments indicated -hidden taxes of $45.7 
billion and additional expenditures of $22.7 
bi II ion from the impact of off-budget Federal 
and federally assisted borrowing-the high 
employment budget would register a deficit 
of $6.5 billion in'1980. 
These adjustments to the official high-
employment budget ought to allow fiscal 
policy to be monitored more accurately. But 
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where should this gauge normally be set? 
According to one view, since many Federal 
and federally assisted capital-goods pur-
chases may yield returns as high as those 
purchased by the private sector, the govern-
ment should run a high-employment budget 
deficit about equal to the size of this capital 
formation. But according to another view, 
taxes distort private decisions, and thus in-
crease consumption and reduce saving arti-
ficially-which suggests that the government 
should offset private-saving shortfalls by gen-
erating a compensating amount of public 
saving through a high-employment budget 
surplus. Moreover, at higher rates of inflation 
the distortion to private saving decisions be-
comes more serious because the tax system is 
not indexed to inflation. In times of low infla-
tion, these two effects might be roughly off-
setting, so that the high employment budget 
could be roughly balanced. But when in-
flation is high, the distortion to saving deci-
sions increases, and a significant surplus 
in the high-employment budget might be 
recommended. 
Given a $6.S-billion deficit in our measure of 
the high-employment budget for 1980, it 
would ordinarily make sense for the new 
Administration to make somewhat larger re-
ductions in expenditures than taxes as it goes 
about the task of reducing the size of govern-
ment. Moreover, in a period like the present, 
when fiscal policy is needed to supplement 
monetary policy in the anti-inflation fight and 
when high inflation may be seriously distort-
ing saving decisions, budgetary discipline 
becomes all the more important. Only to the 
extentthat proposed tax cuts (or indexation of 
taxes) show evidence of substantially boost-
ing saving through improving incentives, 
cou Id we make a reasonable case for not 
making larger reductions in expenditures 
than in receipts. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
SeBected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - ad justed 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 







































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily figures 
Memlber BaJ1Ik Reserve Position 
Excess RBerves (  +  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed (  - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
1.?"/31/80  12/24/80 
n.a.  n.a. 
127  130 
n.a.  n.a. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
9,411  6.8 
9,539  8.3 
3,701  10.9 
6,513  15.0 
595  - 2.4 
206  17.5 
292  - 4.1 
164  1.1 
687  - 1.4 
2,478  - 7.0 
997  3.5 
16,041  27.5 
14,955  30.2 
7,967  36.8 
Comparable 
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